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WERE THERE ADEQUATE STATE 
GROUNDS IN BUSH v. GORE? 
Michael L. Wells* 
Few Supreme Court decisions provoke the immediate and 
intensely negative verdict that law professors passed on Bush v. 
Gore.1 It usually takes some time for scholars to digest the opin-
ions, reflect on the majority's reasoning, and render considered 
judgments. Not so in this case. Within a few days of the 5-4 rul-
ing that halted the recounting of votes for presidential electors in 
Florida, the decision drew withering criticism from scholars 
across the ideological spectrum. Akhil Amar lamented in the 
Los Angeles Times that he must now tell his students not to put 
their trust in judges, even though he considers himself "a friend 
of the U.S. Supreme Court and of many of its current justices";2 
Jeffrey Rosen called the decision a "disgrace" on the cover of 
the New Republic;3 and Herman Schwartz accused the Court of 
"trampl[ing] on ... [b]asic principles of adjudication."4 
Some of the criticism is deserved.5 Professor Amar made a 
powerful case against the majority's ruling that the recount or-
dered by the Florida Supreme Court violated the equal protec-
tion clause for failure to use uniform standards throughout the 
state. Amar pointed out that vote counting standards vary from 
* Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia. The author wishes to 
thank Laura Fitzgerald, Barry Friedman, Lonny Hoffman, Richard Nagarada, and 
Robert Schapiro for helpful comments on a draft of this article. 
1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
2. Akhil Reed Amar, Supreme Court: Should We Trust Judges?, Los Angeles 
Times M1 (Dec. 17, 2000). 
3. Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, New Republic 18 (Dec. 25, 2000). 
4. Herman Schwartz, The God That Failed, The Nation 5, 6 (Jan. 1, 2001). 
5. Some of it seems rather unfair. For example, Professor Rosen detects similari-
ties between the five Justices in the majority and former President Clinton: "It will be 
impossible to look at O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas in the same 
light again, much as it was impossible to look at President Clinton in the same light after 
seeing him exposed in the Starr Report." Rosen, Disgrace at 20 (cited in note 3). Vincent 
Bugliosi thinks that his "background in criminal law is sufficient to inform you that 
Scalia, Thomas et al. are criminals in the very truest sense of the word." Vincent 
Bugliosi, None Dare Cal! It Treason, The Nation 11, 14 (Feb. 5, 2001). 
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locality to locality all over the nation, that they always have, and 
that the Court could cite no precedent to support its equal pro-
tection theory. Others have questioned whether the ruling rests 
on any general principle at all, given the care the Court took to 
limit its reasoning to the extraordinary circumstances of the 
Florida presidential election.6 Even Michael McConnell, a well-
known conservative scholar, was troubled by the implications of 
the holding. By reaching the equal protection issue, the Court 
evidently accepted the notion that recounts were appropriate in 
connection with the election contest. Yet the Court put a stop to 
the recount that was underway. McConnell observed that "[t]he 
court did not have the resolution to declare that no recount was 
necessary, or the patience to declare that a proper recount 
should proceed. "7 
It is all too easy to leap from this well-founded critique of 
the Court's reasoning to the conclusion that the majority-all of 
whom were appointed by Republican presidents-were bent on 
installing George W. Bush in the White House by any means 
they could find, and that the holding rests not at all on law but 
solely on naked politics.8 Putting aside the majority's reasoning, 
a better ground on which to defend Bush is that the Florida Su-
preme Court (the "Florida Court") violated article II, § 1, clause 
2 of the Constitution, which provides that "[e]ach state shall ap-
point, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, 
[presidential] electors."9 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas (the "plural-
ity"), advanced an argument along these lines, and the four dis-
senters devoted parts of their opinions to refuting it. Though the 
plurality grasped the basic issue in Bush, it did not make the best 
case for reversal. The dissenters understandably responded only 
to the plurality's weak arguments and not the stronger ones that 
should have been marshaled for reversal. 
The Chief Justice was right to be concerned about article II, 
but committed a critical error in his treatment of the "adequate 
and independent state ground" doctrine. The plurality was con-
fronted with a state court opinion that did not purport to rely on 
federal law. If we leave equal protection out of the analysis (as I 
6. Amy Waldman, Ruling Will Hold a Place, As Yet Unclear, in History, N.Y. 
Times A32 (Dec. 14, 2000) (attributing this view to Frank Michelman). 
7. Michael W. McConnell, A Muddled Ruling, Wall St. J. A26 (Dec. 14, 2000). 
8. See, e.g., Bugliosi, None Dare Call it Treason at 11 (cited in note 5). (advancing 
this view); Jonathan Chait, Not Equal, New Republic 14, 15 (Dec. 25, 2000) (similar). 
9. U.S. Const. Art. II,§ 1, cl. 2. 
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do throughout the remainder of this article), the threshold ques-
tion is how one justifies the Court's exercise of jurisdiction, for 
state courts are sovereign over matters of state law. The general 
rule is that the Supreme Court may review a case from a state 
court unless the state court judgment rests on an adequate and 
independent state ground. The plurality rightly found that, de-
spite the Florida Court's failure to address federal article II is-
sues, there was not an adequate state ground here. 
But the plurality was right for the wrong reason. The "ade-
quate state ground" doctrine is complex and sophisticated. It 
consists of not one but four principles for determining adequacy, 
with the choice among them depending on the relation between 
federal and state law in the case at hand. The plurality confused 
two of its branches and placed Bush in the wrong doctrinal cate-
gory. Worse, the category in which the plurality put the case 
demands a stronger showing to justify Supreme Court review 
than the one to which Bush should have been assigned. The plu-
rality cited cases which hold that the state ruling should stand 
unless the state court distorted state law in order to evade fed-
eral protections. The proper rule for Bush is that the state 
court's reasoning deserves no deference. The existence of a fed-
eral constraint on state court authority, such as article II, is suffi-
cient to justify intervention. As a result of Rehnquist's miscue, 
the dissenters had little difficulty in rebutting the plurality's justi-
fications for review. Had Rehnquist advanced the more compel-
ling arguments for Supreme Court review that were available to 
him, the article II challenge could not have been rebuffed with 
such ease. 
While my argument that the plurality and the dissents went 
astray in their treatment of the adequate state ground doctrine 
bolsters the result in Bush, it does not necessarily imply that the 
plurality was right on the merits. Whether the state grounds 
could withstand scrutiny under the proper test is a separate ques-
tion from whether the Justices used the right test in the first 
place. My focus is on the latter issue. As far as the analysis in 
this paper is concerned, the Florida Court's judgment may still 
be defensible. 
I 
Chief Justice Rehnquist began by acknowledging that "[i]n 
most cases, comity and respect for federalism compel us to defer 
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to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law. "10 But that 
principle did not apply to Bush, because this was not an ordinary 
state law case. Federal law is also relevant to its disposition, for 
article 11-with its command that "the Legislature ... direct[s]"11 
the manner of choosing electors-is one of "a few exceptional 
cases in which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a 
power on a particular branch of a State's government. "12 There-
fore, "the text of the election law itself, and not just its interpre-
tation b1 the courts of the States, takes on independent signifi-
cance."1 A "significant departure" from that text by the Florida 
courts "presents a federal constitutional question."14 
Having identified a federal interest at stake in the case, the 
plurality proceeded to invoke the doctrine on Supreme Court 
review of the adequacy of state grounds. It cited a number of 
cases in which the state court relied on state law, yet the Su-
preme Court reviewed and overturned the judgments. The gen-
eral principle underlying such cases is that, in the event a ruling 
on state law has adverse impact on a federal right, "the Constitu-
tion requires [the] Court to undertake an independent, if still 
deferential, analysis of state law."15 The plurality identified two 
major problems with the decisions of the Florida Court. First, 
the Florida Court had taken away authority that the election 
statute assigned to other officers, including the Secretary of State 
and the local canvassing boards, to determine when and for what 
purpose hand recounts would be undertaken. 16 Second, the 
Florida Court justified its intervention by broadly reading the 
statutory term "legal vote" as imposing an obligation on election 
officials to count ballots that the voting machines could not read. 
Rehnquist countered that the Florida statutes place the respon-
sibility upon the voters to ensure that the machines can read 
their votes. Hence, "[n]o reasonable person" could find that a 
contest should succeed "when electronic or electromechanical 
equipment performs precisely in the manner designed, and fails 
to count those ballots that are not marked in the manner that 
these voting instructions explicitly and prominently specify."17 
10. Bush, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rchnquist, C.J., concurring). 
11. Id. Justice Rehnquist italicized the word "Legislature" when he quoted this 
language. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 114. 
16. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 116 (discussing the authority of these officers). 
17. Id. at 119. 
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In ruling differently, the Florida Court had rejected the Secre-
tary of State's interpretation of the statutory provisions, though 
Florida law requires it to defer to her on such issues.18 
Four members of the Court dissented from the judgment, 
and all of them took the time to address the plurality's theory of 
the case as well. The dissenters accepted the plurality's view that 
the key issue was the scope of Supreme Court review of the state 
law grounds on which the Florida judgment rested, but each of 
them found fault with Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning. 
Though they emphasized different aspects of the case, they all 
made the same point: While the Florida Court's reasoning could 
be faulted, it did nothing out of the ordinary.19 The Florida 
Court engaged in the kind of legal reasoning that is typical of 
courts,20 and the Supreme Court should not interfere with its rul-
ings on issues of state law.21 
All seven justices who addressed the relevance of article II 
took the wrong doctrinal path. As a result, none of them fo-
cused their attention on the constitutional issue that needed to 
be addressed in order to determine whether the Florida Court 
acted properly. In particular, the plurality's error in resorting to 
a particular group of "adequate state ground" cases deflected at-
tention from the question of whether the Florida Court's ruling 
was compatible with article II, and enabled the dissenters to 
avoid that issue as well. The mistake is understandable, for all 
concerned were under tremendous time pressure, the Florida 
Court did focus on state law, and the case raises a novel constitu-
tional issue. The Justices were dealing with an aspect of Su-
preme Court review doctrine that rarely arises in litigation and 
has never received sustained attention from the Court. Anyone 
can make a mistake about the application of an ill-defined doc-
trine in an unfamiliar constitutional context, especially when one 
is in a hurry. 
II 
In most legal systems there is one sovereign government, 
and all law making authority resides there. The more complex 
18. Id. at 120. 
19. Id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
20. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). (The decisions of the Florida 
Court "were rooted in long-established precedent and were consistent with the relevant 
statutory provisions, taken as a whole.") 
21. Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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American federal system divides lawmaking authority between 
the national government and the state governments. Moreover, 
federal law rarely displaces state authority entirely. Typically, 
some of the questions in a case are matters of federal law, but 
others may be governed by state law, and it is not always clear 
which body of law controls a particular issue. While federal law 
prevails in any contest between state and federal law, the states 
are free to proceed as they wish in the absence of conflict with 
federal law. The Supreme Court's role is to see that federal law 
receives the respect it deserves from the state courts, no more 
and no less. Consequently, the availability of Supreme Court re-
view of a state court decision depends on whether the state rul-
ing in some way implicates federal law. Even when federal law 
is at stake in a case, the rationale for Supreme Court review is a 
restraint on its scope. Because the Supreme Court may inter-
vene only insofar as necessary to defend the federal interest and 
no further, review is ordinarily limited to the federal issues.22 
At first glance these principles of federalism seem to stand 
in the way of Supreme Court review in Bush, for the Florida Su-
preme Court relied exclusively on state law. Of course, the state 
court opinion does not by itself determine what issues are at 
stake. Otherwise, state courts could evade review simply by re-
fusing to address federal issues. In Bush, all nine Justices agreed 
that the Court should examine the equal protection issue, though 
the state court did not consider it. But I have, for purposes of 
isolating other aspects of the case, chosen to set aside the equal 
protection claim. With the equal protection issue out of the 
case, Supreme Court review can be justified only if there is some 
other federal element that the Florida Supreme Court should 
have, but did not, take into account. That federal element is 
supplied by article II, which grants authority to the state legisla-
ture to direct the manner of choosing presidential electors. Ac-
cording to George W. Bush, the Florida Court's decision vio-
lated article II by changing the legislative scheme. 
The problem with the handling of this issue by the seven 
Justices who addressed it in Bush is that they put the case in the 
wrong doctrinal pigeonhole, and consequently employed the 
wrong standard of review for evaluating the state judgment. 
Four fact patterns give rise to Supreme Court review of a state 
judgment. Each of the four presents a different mix of policy 
22 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1875). See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489,502-04 (1954). 
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considerations and each is governed by different principles. In 
order to show how the Justices erred, it will be useful to point 
out the differences between these four situations. 
1. Inadequate State Substantive Grounds. In one set of 
cases, the state court purports to rely solely on state law, yet the 
state grounds are not sufficient by themselves to sustain the 
judgment. Suppose a state statute is challenged on both state 
and federal grounds, as where someone claims that the provision 
violates both the free speech clause of the First Amendment and 
a state free speech clause. If the state court strikes the statute 
down, relying exclusively on the state constitution to do so, the 
Supreme Court may not review the decision. The state ground is 
adequate to sustain the judgment invalidating the law, no matter 
how the federal due process issue is resolved. The same result 
would follow in a case where the state court relied on both the 
state and federal provisions, but made it clear that the ruling on 
state law was not influenced by federal law. By contrast, sup-
pose the state court upholds the statute in an opinion that cites 
no federal authority and purports to rely solely on state law. 
The state ground is inadequate to support the judgment in such a 
case, simply because the statute would fall if the federal issue 
were resolved differently. The same result would follow, and for 
the same reason, if the state upheld the statute against both the 
state and federal attacks. The point is that in such a case it is ir-
relevant whether the state court does or does not address the 
federal issue.23 
The federal interest in such a case is in assuring that federal 
rights receive due regard in the state courts. When the state 
court upholds the statute, with or without mentioning the federal 
grounds on which it was attacked, this federal interest is threat-
ened, for the statute may in fact violate the federal right of free 
speech. But when the state court strikes down the statute on 
state law grounds, there is no danger that the value of free 
speech will get less respect than it deserves. Another factor that 
bears on the Court's refusal to review such cases is the policy of 
avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. In such a case, 
nothing the Court does will change the outcome in any event. 
23. The doctrine summarized in this paragraph is discussed in detail in R. Fallon, et 
al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 525-27 (Foundation 
Press, 4th ed. 1996). I do not discuss the issues that arise when the state court opinion is 
ambiguous as to whether it relies on state or federal grounds, see, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032 (1983), as they have no apparent bearing on the aspect of Bush that I ad-
dress in this article. 
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So long as the state court does not rely on federal principles in 
interpreting the state constitution, there is no federal interest in 
the resolution of the state law issue, and no justification for Su-
preme Court review.24 
2. The Remote Federal Premise. Suppose, however, that the 
state court does rely on federal free speech principles in the 
course of ruling that the statute offends the state constitution. 
For example, the state court may cite federal cases in deciding 
that the state constitution forbids interference with commercial 
speech. Or it may hold that the state's tax law exempts the sala-
ries of federal workers from the state's income tax because there 
is a federal constitutional prohibition on state taxation of certain 
federal salaries. In such a case there is no danger that the state 
court has failed to show sufficient respect for the federal interest. 
On the contrary, the state court has done its utmost to avoid a 
decision that is at odds with federal law. These have been called 
"remote federal premise" cases25 because the ruling on state law 
depends in some way on a premise derived from federal law. 
Though the supremacy of federal law is not threatened by 
the state judgment, Supreme Court may review a case of this 
type. The policy underlying review is that the Court's role goes 
beyond guaranteeing that state courts give federal law the re-
spect it deserves. In addition, the Supreme Court must guard 
against state courts giving too much weight to federal law.26 In 
State Tax Commission v. Van Cott/7 the Court faced the state tax 
immunity issue and ruled that the state court's federal premise 
was wrong. There is no federal rule forbidding the taxation of 
federal salaries.28 In Van Cott, the Court did not simply reverse 
the judgment. It remanded the case so that the state court could 
decide the state tax immunity issue free of the influence of a 
faulty federal premise. As it happens, the state court affirmed its 
24. See Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 524 (cited in 
note 23). 
25. Peter W. Low and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-
State Relations 86 (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 1998). 
26. Of course, one could argue, as Justice Stevens has,. that this federal interest is 
ordinarily not strong enough to warrant a grant of certiorari. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 695, 697 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fallon, et al., The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System at 536 (cited in note 23). No one questions the existence 
of a federal interest in such cases, though its strength may be debatable. 
27. State Tax Comm. of Utah v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939). See Ronald J. 
Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 289, 320 (1969). 
28. The state court's error was understandable. It had relied on an earlier Supreme 
Court case that the Court overruled on the same day it decided VanCott. See Van Cott, 
306 U.S. at 515. 
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earlier ruling.29 Similarly, in cases where some of the state 
judges whose votes are necessary to the judgment have relied on 
state law and others on federal law, the Court may review the 
judgment, correct any errors in the relevant judges' understand-
ing of federal law, and remand for the state court to proceed as it 
sees fit. 30 
3. State Procedural Grounds. Federal substantive rights are 
often litigated in state court proceedings, especially criminal 
proceedings in which various provisions of the bill of rights may 
be at issue. Litigants seeking to assert federal rights in state 
court are ordinarily expected to comply with state procedural 
rules. For example, the state rule may require that objections to 
the introduction of evidence be made contemporaneously with 
the proffer, so that the issue can be decided before any problem 
of jury prejudice arises. Now suppose a criminal defendant has 
federal law grounds for challenging the introduction of evidence, 
for example, an argument that the evidence was obtained by a 
search that violated his fourth amendment rights. If his lawyer 
does not make the objection at the proper time under state law, 
the client will ordinarily be deemed to have waived the right.31 
On a superficial level cases of this type resemble the ade-
quate state ground cases. In both fact patterns, the state ground 
may be adequate to support the judgment. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court will generally respect a valid state procedural rule and up-
hold the state court's refusal to ignore the litigant's "procedural 
default." But the similarity vanishes when one considers the pol-
icy issues bearing on the state procedural grounds cases. While 
federal rights are not threatened by a state court decision strik-
ing down a state statute on state substantive grounds, the same 
cannot be said of a decision to uphold a state judgment resting 
on state procedural grounds. In such a case the state court has 
refused to protect federal rights because of a state procedural 
rule, and the effect of respecting the state ground is precisely the 
opposite of that in the inadequate state ground cases. 
No doubt for that reason, the Supreme Court shows less re-
spect for state procedural grounds than for substantive 
grounds.32 Instead of simply accepting the state's claim that it 
29. VanCott v. State Tax Comm, 98 Utah 264,96 P.2d 740 (1939). 
30. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973). 
31. For a collection of materials dealing with this problem, see Fallon, et al., The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System at 566-90 (cited in note 23). 
32. See id. at 576-77; Daniel Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 
Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1131-32 (1986). 
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has a sufficiently strong interest in its rule to warrant the state 
court's decision to ignore the federal claim, the Supreme Court 
will make a judgment as to the importance the state actually ac-
cords its rule. Sometimes the Court will carefully examine the 
state courts' application of state procedures in earlier cases in 
order to determine just how much respect the procedural rule at 
issue actually receives in the state courts. If the requirement is a 
novel one or has been inconsistently applied, the Supreme Court 
may pay no attention to it and reach the merits of the federal 
constitutional issue.33 Thus, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Flow-
ers34 the Court refused to follow a state procedural rule that state 
courts had not previously applied "with the pointless severity" 
shown in this case. 
Sometimes, the Court seems to make a judgment as to the 
whether the state procedural rule actually serves any worthwhile 
purpose. For example, in James v. Kentucki5 it faced a state 
rule requiring that a certain kind of objection to the charge to 
the jury be called an "instruction" rather than an "admonition," 
as the criminal defendant's lawyer had labeled it. The Court 
reached the merits of the constitutional issue-which related to 
inferences to be drawn from a defendant's failure to testify-and 
explained that the state rule was "an arid ritual of meaningless 
form. "36 Though the Court in James and other procedural 
ground cases often disparages the state rule, a key feature of 
them is that it does not go so far as to hold the state rule uncon-
stitutional, even as applied to the case at hand.37 If the Court 
went that far in every case where it ignored a procedural ground, 
the state procedural grounds category would collapse into the 
inadequate state grounds category. 
4. Antecedent State Substantive Grounds. These are cases in 
which state law creates a right and federal law protects that "an-
tecedent" state right. State law is the source of most property 
rights, as well as the primary source of legal protection of liberty. 
Freedom of contract, for example, is mainly a product of state 
law. At the same time, the federal constitution protects the 
property and liberty rights that are created by state law. The just 
33. See Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 580 (cited in 
note 23). 
34. NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 294-302 (1964). See also 
Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 581 (cited in note 23). 
35. James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341,345-48 (1984). 
36. Id. at 349 (quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313,320 (1958)). 
37. See Meltzer, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1160 (cited in note 32). 
2001] ADEQUATE GROUNDS 413 
compensation clause forbids governments from taking property 
without paying for it, and the contracts clause obliges states to 
respect their contractual obligations.38 
When a dispute arises between government and a person 
who claims to hold such a right, the state court may deny relief 
either because the state's interference with the right is not a con-
stitutional violation or because the right never existed in the first 
place. The former is a matter of federal law that is plainly sub-
ject to Supreme Court review. Though the latter is a ruling on 
state law, there is a federal interest in its resolution, for the state 
court may be suspected of having distorted its analysis of state 
law in order to thwart federal protection of the right. If the state 
law claim of right is a good one despite the ruling of the state 
court, then the federal law protecting that right means that there 
is a federal interest in the outcome of the litigation. In that 
event, Supreme Court review can be justified. An example is 
Indiana ex rei. Anderson v. Brand,39 in which a state statute regu-
lated the employment rights of school teachers. When a teacher 
was fired, she claimed that the state law had created a contrac-
tual right to tenure and sued for reinstatement on the ground 
that this right was protected by the Contracts Clause. The state 
court ruled, as a matter of state law, that no contract existed in 
the first place. The Supreme Court examined the reasoning be-
hind this holding, found it wanting, and held that state law did 
indeed create a contract between the state and the teacher. 
Thus, the state law ruling against the teacher violated her rights 
under the Contracts Clause. 
In order to grasp the policy issue raised by these claims, one 
must pay attention to their structure. Their distinctive feature is 
that the only substantive right at stake is a matter of state law, 
yet the federal constitution is also relevant on account of the 
protection it gives the state-created right. These cases differ 
from those resting on inadequate state grounds, in that here a 
ruling against the litigant who asserts state law claims does 
threaten the federal interest in the case. They differ from cate-
gory # 2, simply because there is no claim that the ruling on state 
law depends on a remote federal premise. Unlike category# 3, 
they do not concern state procedures through which federal 
38. See Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflec-
tions on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1043, 1050-
52 (1977); Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 520-21, 551-65 
(cited in note 23). 
39. Indiana ex rei. Alderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938). 
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rights are adjudicated, but state substantive rights that receive 
federal protection. 
Antecedent state substantive grounds cases present an es-
pecially complex relation between state and federal law. There 
is a federal interest in the outcome of the state law question, yet 
it remains a state law question. The latter aspect weighs in favor 
of leaving its resolution to the state court, and sometimes the 
Court does take a deferential view of state law. On the other 
hand, the Supreme Court occasionally seems to begin from the 
premise that vindicating the federal interest is important enough 
to justify a de novo review of state law. A third approach is a 
kind of intermediate scrutiny. The Court will "inquire whether 
the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or substantial ba-
sis,"40 and uphold the state judgment "if there is no evasion of 
the constitutional issue, and the nonfederal ground of decision 
has fair support."41 Notice that the standard of review here re-
sembles that of cases resting on state procedural grounds, per-
haps because the underlying problem of balancing state and fed-
eral issues is roughly similar in the two types of cases. Though 
the fact patterns differ, there are both state and federal interests 
at stake in each category, and the federal interest cannot be vin-
dicated without paying some attention to the state ground. 
Before turning to Bush, notice one other feature of the ade-
quate state ground doctrine: there is a significant difference be-
tween the inadequate state grounds and remote federal premises 
categories, on the one hand, and the state procedural grounds 
and antecedent state grounds categories on the other. If a case 
falls within the first two categories, the federal interest is merely 
in resolving the federal issue. So long as the state court follows 
the Supreme Court's ruling on the federal issue, it may do as it 
pleases with regard to state law. In the latter two categories, the 
Supreme Court may not content itself with correcting issues of 
federal law, for the federal interest can be vindicated only by 
Supreme Court review of the state court's resolution of state law 
issues. In one sense, Supreme Court review may be more defer-
ential in such cases, as the Court acknowledges that the primary 
responsibility for making state law remains with the state courts. 
In another sense, Supreme Court review is more searching, sim-
40. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944) (quoting 
Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537,540 (1930)). 
41. Id. See Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 941, 965 
(1965). 
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ply because the Court must go beyond the federal issues to ex-
amine state court rulings on state law as well. 
III 
Chief Justice Rehnquist committed a fatal error midway 
through his opinion. The critical paragraph reads as follows: 
In order to determine whether a state court has infringed 
upon the legislature's authority, we necessarily must examine 
the law of the State as it existed prior to the action of the 
court. Though we generally defer to state courts on the inter-
pretation of state law ... there are of course areas in which 
the Constitution requires this Court to undertake an inde-
pendent, if still deferential, analysis of state law.42 
Notice that, after identifying the article II issue and the need to 
"examine the law of the State as it existed prior to the action of 
the court" in order to resolve it, the opinion quite abruptly shifts 
gears and moves into a discussion of Supreme Court review of 
the state law grounds relied upon by state courts, by "an inde-
pendent, if still deferential, analysis of state law." In the ensuing 
discussion, he cites one procedural state ground case, NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rei. Patterson,43 in which the state had imposed a 
novel procedural requirement as a ground for finding a forfei-
ture of federal rights.44 Rehnquist also cites Bouie v. City of Co-
lumbia,45 in which the Court held outright that the state court's 
interpretation of a criminal statute broadened the law "beyond 
what a fair reading provided, in violation of due process. "46 This 
constitutional ruling takes the case out of the procedural cate-
gory. Since the state ground was accordingly inadequate to sup-
port the judgment without the need for any delicate weighing of 
state and federal interests, this case belongs in the inadequate 
state grounds category. Finally, Rehnquist cites a as antecedent 
state grounds case, in which the state had created property 
rights, those rights were protected by federal law, and the Su-
preme Court asserted the power to examine the state law under-
pinnings of rulings that no property right existed in the first 
42. Bush, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
43. NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
44. The reason why the case belongs in the procedural default category is that the 
Court in NAACP did not find that the state's procedural rule or its application was un-
constitutional. 
45. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
46. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
416 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:403 
place.47 Bush was "precisely parallel,"48 Rehnquist claimed, be-
cause the Florida Court had "impermissibly distorted" the Flor-
ida election laws "beyond what a fair reading required. "49 
Pursuing this framework of analysis throughout the remain-
der of his opinion, the Chief Justice concluded that "[n]o rea-
sonable person"50 would read one provision of state law as the 
Florida Court had done. Another aspect of the ruling was "ab-
surd,"51 and another was "peculiar."52 Rehnquist's reasoning 
takes for granted the proposition that his task is to examine the 
state law grounds under the deferential standards of the state 
procedural grounds and the antecedent state grounds catego-
ries.53 The dissents eagerly endorsed the plurality's focus on the 
state court's state law reasoning and the plurality's willingness to 
employ a deferential standard of review of that reasoning. Jus-
tice Stevens found that the "Florida Supreme Court ~did not] 
make any substantive change in Florida electoral law. "5 Justice 
Souter insisted that "[n]one of the state court's interpretations is 
unreasonable to the point of displacing the legislative enact-
ment."55 Justice Ginsberg found "no reason to upset ~the Florida 
Court's] reasoned interpretation of Florida law." 6 Justice 
Breyer examined the state law grounds and found no "impermis-
sible distortion" of the election law.57 
In citing state procedural grounds precedent and especially 
in characterizing Bush as a "fair support" case, the plurality 
made both an analytical error and a strategic blunder. The ana-
lytical error was a failure to appreciate the structural differences 
between Bush and there procedural ground and fair support 
47. Id. at 115 n.l (citing Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (1813)). 
In this footnote the Court also cited Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992). The case is analytically similar to Fairfax's Devisee, in that both concern 
federal protection of antecedent state rights. But the state did not contest the existence 
of the plaintiffs state Jaw property right in Lucas, focusing instead on the scope of its 
power to regulate the use of the property consistent with the Takings Clause. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court faced no "adequate state ground" issue. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 119. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 120 
53. Since the state Jaw rulings here are plainly substantive rather than procedural, I 
assume Rehnquist would, if pressed for specifics, put the case in the antecedent grounds 
category. 
54. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
55. Id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
56. Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
57. Id. at 150 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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category is of cases. But the plurality not only misapplied the 
doctrines. By doing so, it carelessly handed its adversaries a 
powerful weapon as well. As the dissenters said over and over 
again, in procedural and fair support cases, the review of state 
law is typically deferential, as the state has a strong claim to 
make whatever rules it pleases on matters of state law in cases 
with these characteristics. 58 Bush is actually a simple case of fed-
eral law constraining state authority, and falls within the cate-
gory of cases resting on inadequate state substantive grounds. 
No deference toward the state court's interpretation of state law 
is called for in such a case. 
The procedural and antecedent grounds fact patterns raise 
subtle problems of federal-state relations. It is far harder to 
fashion suitable rules for resolving such cases than it is to deal 
with the other types of Supreme Court review. Compare them 
with the inadequate grounds and remote premise categories. 
When the state court purports to rely on a state ground, but the 
judgment cannot stand without the resolution of a federal issue 
inadequacy, the case for Supreme Court review of the federal is-
sue is straightforward. Whatever else the Court should be doing, 
its essential role is to vindicate federal rights. When the state's 
ruling depends on a "remote federal premise," the case for fed-
eral intervention depends on the equally plain, if less compelling, 
argument that federal interests should receive no more weight 
than a correct reading of federal law would give them. 59 
By contrast, when a litigant fails to follow a concededly 
valid state procedure in asserting his federal claim, both federal 
and state interests are at stake. Similarly, antecedent grounds 
cases arise when a right that is created by state law is coupled 
with federal protection of that right. The federal interest is not 
in defining the scope of the right. If there were a federal consti-
tutional, statutory, or common law doctrine setting up such a 
right, the case would raise no hard Supreme Court review issue 
at all. But in these cases the right is purely a creature of state 
law. Since there is no federal interest in the question of whether 
the right exists in the first place, the Supreme Court defers to the 
state court on state law. And yet there is a federal interest in the 
protection of the state-created right. Consequently, the review 
of state court rulings on the state law issue of whether there is a 
58. See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 133 (Souter, 1., 
dissenting); id. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 148-51 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
59. See text accompanying notes 25-29. 
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right must not be too deferential. The Supreme Court must as-
certain whether the state court has, under the guise of interpret-
ing state law, in effect denied the pre-existing state-created right 
the protection federal law accords it. To this end, the Court does 
not usually engage in an independent examination of state law, 
but instead asks whether the state law provides fair support for 
the state court's ruling.60 
In the real world, the context in which these procedural 
grounds and antecedent state law cases arise will matter greatly 
in their resolution. It is not a coincidence that two of the cases 
the plurality cited concerned litigation in southern courts over 
the civil rights in the 1960s.61 At that time and place, anyone 
could see that those courts would employ whatever means they 
could to avoid recognizing the constitutional rights of blacks. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court approached the examination of 
the state law issues with more than normal skepticism. A third 
was an episode in a battle over the scope of national power, be-
tween the state of Virginia and the Supreme Court, in the early 
years of the nation.62 When there is no evidence of such "recalci-
trance,"63 the state court ruling is more likely to withstand scru-
tiny, tho~h there are still plenty of examples of cases where it 
does not. 
This delicate balancing of state and federal interests is a 
consequence of the complex relationship between state and fed-
eral law in procedural ground and antecedent state law cases, in 
which rights are created by state law and protected by federal 
law, or created by federal law and adjudicated under state pro-
cedures. When the relation between state and federal law is the 
more typical arrangement, in which federal law imposes con-
straints of one kind or another on state law, the rationale for 
"measured deference" to state court determinations disappears. 
60. Compare Indiana ex rei. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) ("ac-
cord[ing] respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the state's highest 
court") and Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930) ("fair 
support") with Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813) (inde-
pendent evaluation of state law). 
61. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Pat-
terson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). SeeR. Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal Sys-
tem at 576-77 (cited in note 23) & n.2 (discussing the context in which these cases were 
adjudicated). . 
62 Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813). 
63. This is Justice Ginsburg's characterization of the state court attitude that can 
give rise to reversal in such a case. See Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 549 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
64. See Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 551-65 (cited in 
note 23) (discussing the case law). 
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The same is true of a case, in which the state court relies on a 
federal premise in making state law. In these cases, the state 
court's rulings on matters of federal law will receive no defer-
ence at all. 
Now consider the relation between state and federal law in 
Bush. Article II, whatever it may mean, does not protect a state-
created right to vote. Indeed, the background of article II sug-
gests that the framers avoided taking a position on whether 
states should use popular election to choose presidential elec-
tors.65 Article II is properly characterized as a constraint on the 
way the state goes about choosing the electors. Whether it is a 
very loose constraint that imposes few restrictions, or a strict one 
that keeps state courts on a short leash is the central substantive 
question at issue in Bush, and one that I do not reach here. The 
present point is that the Bush fact pattern lacks the key attribute 
of a "fair support" case, namely federal protection of an antece-
dent state law right. Lacking that attribute, there is no ground 
for any deference at all to the state court's rulings on matters of 
state law. Nor, of course, is Bush a case where federal rights are 
at stake in a state case, and a state procedural default has re-
sulted in their forfeiture. 
IV 
Despite these criticisms of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion, he was right in his intuition that a proper resolution of the 
case required some examination of the Florida Court's reason-
ing. In most inadequate state grounds cases the Court can take 
the state court's rulings on state law at face value and focus 
solely on whether those decisions are compatible with federal 
law. Bush is different from other cases in this category, because 
the constitutional issue at stake here is whether the Florida 
Court properly applied the state law materials bearing on elec-
tion contests. Though the plurality and the dissents differed on 
whether the Florida Court had gone too far, they agreed that re-
65. Historical materials bearing on article II. § 1 can be found in Philip B. Kurland 
and Ralph Lerner, eds., 3 The Founders' Constitution 534-61 (U. Chicago Press, 1987). 
The big issue for the framers was whether the president should be elected by a plebiscite, 
or by the Congress, or by some other method. Part of the compromise was to create the 
electoral college, with the idea that it could at least narrow down the field, and to dele-
gate to the state legislatures the choice of a methodology for choosing electors. The 
framers seem to have contemplated that the state legislatures would be free either to pick 
the electors themselves or to hold a plebiscite. 
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solving this federal issue required the Court to examine the Flor-
ida Court's treatment of state law.66 
Rehnquist's error was to suppose that, in the course of ex-
amining the Florida Court's application of state law, the Su-
preme Court must show some deference to the state court, just 
because it must do so in certain other situations. Pressed for 
time, he confused the substantive article II issue with the wholly 
irrelevant body of law on Supreme Court review of procedural 
default and fair support/antecedent grounds cases. There is a 
superficial similarity between article II issue and Supreme Court 
review, for both queries demand scrutiny of state law. By coin-
cidence, they may produce the same result in any given case. 
Still, they require rather different inquiries. The federalism is-
sues raised by Supreme Court review demand deference to state 
law when a procedural default has occurred or when federal 
rights depend on a state law antecedent. By contrast, article II is 
a constraint on what the state court can do and article II chal-
lenges belong in the category of nondeferential cases involving 
inadequate state substantive grounds.67 While the exact content 
of the limits on state courts remain uncertain after Bush, we 
know that article II may demand scrutiny of the state court's 
reasoning and a comparison between Florida's election law be-
fore and after the Florida Court's intervention.68 Whatever the 
66. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 114-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 127 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (Florida Court's "decisions were rooted in long-established precedent and 
were consistent with the relevant statutory provisions, taken as a whole"); id. at 131 
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("(n]one of the state court's interpretations is unreasonable to the 
point of displacing the legislative enactment"); id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (find-
ing "no cause here to believe that the members of Florida's high court have done less 
than 'their mortal best to discharge their oath of office' and no cause to upset their rea-
soned interpretation of Florida law" (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981)); 
id. at 147-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (examining the state court's reasoning and finding no 
"impermissible distortion" of state law). 
67. Whether Article II is better viewed as a kind of "state separation of powers" 
provision, as Rehnquist seemed to conceive of it, or in some other way is a question best 
left for another day. In my view a strong case can be made for reversing the Florida 
Court on the ground that Article II is, among other things, a safeguard against judicial 
efforts to change the rules governing an election after the election has taken place. See 
Michael L. Wells and Jeffry Netter, Article II and the Florida Election Case 61 Maryland 
L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2002). 
68. In advancing the argument that the Supreme Court must examine state law in 
order to resolve the article II issue, my premise is that article II is a source of judicially 
enforceable rules regulating state presidential election practices. A serious constitutional 
argument can be made that the Supreme Court has no role in evaluating the o.utcome of 
the state's process for choosing electors. If two (or more) sets of electors clatm to vote 
for the state, it is, under this view, up to Congress to resolve the dispute. Justice Breyer, 
joined on this point by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, advanced this thesis in his dissent. 
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 152-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). If he is right, there is no "adequate 
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precise standard by which the Florida Court's work is evaluated, 
the doctrine on Supreme Court review of state judgments im-
poses upon the Court no obligation to defer to the Florida 
Court's rulings on state law issues. George W. Bush did not 
need to show that the Florida Court "impermissibly distorted"69 
state law in order to win; nor does the state ruling survive scru-
tiny merely because it may be a "reasonable"70 construction of 
the Florida election statute. 
state ground" issue to cope with, simply because there is no Supreme Court review in the 
first place. 
69. ld. at 149 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
70. ld. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
